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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
GEORGE

F

E.

HALL, JR.

ROM the advent of the machine and the growth of
the factory system, following what is known in history as the Industrial Revolution, from about the year
17501 to the end of the nineteenth century, the lot of the
workingman was a sorry one indeed. In economics, politics, philosophy, and sociology the doctrine of laissez
faire- free trade and free competition- was the controlling ideal. The only laws that it was thought should
be controlling were natural laws, and governments were
to keep their hands off in regard to everything except
the actual determination of these laws.
These laws are the rules of justice, of morality, of conduct, useful to all and to each. Neither men nor governments make them
nor can make them. They recognize them as conforming to the
supreme reason which governs the universe; they declare them;
they present them to the obedience of good men, even to the
conscience of the wicked ....
These laws are irrevocable, they
pertain to the essence of men and things; they are the expression
of the will of God; and the more one reflects, the more one
2
reveres them.
With a doctrine such as this controlling the minds of
the middle class. leaders of the time--that is, the heads
of the factories-it is easy to see that the laboring class
did not have much chance to better its own condition, and
it is a matter of common knowledge how bad those conditions really were. One has but to read a bit of the
literature of the period, especially "Hard Times" by
Charles, Dickens, to appreciate fully the absolute inequality which the laboring man suffered. As time wore on,
however, the ranks of the workers produced leaders and
sympathizers who were willing to fight for them, and
gradually unions were organized. Whether or not we favor
1 Solomon Blum, Labor Economics (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1926),
p. 3.
2 John Herman Randall, Jr., Making of the Modern Mind (Chicago: Houghton, Miflin Co., 1926), p. 323.
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the ideals and methods of the present-day union, we must
admit that were it not for the heroic struggles of the
early union men, no workmen's compensation legislation
would exist today. The trend, though long and hardfought, was a natural one. The great mass of people,
then and now, were in favor of any measures that would
benefit the common man, and once they were awakened
to the conditions that existed during the latter part of the
eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries, they
hastened to make strong demands upon their law makers
that such conditions should be eradicated or at least
greatly bettered. This new ideal of regulation and control has been recognized and described by Woodrow
Wilson in these words:
Human freedom consists in perfect adjustments of human interests and human activities and human energies. Now, the adjustments necessary between individuals, between individuals and
complex institutions amidst which they live, and between those
institutions and the government, are infinitely more intricate
today than ever before. Life has become complex; there are
many more elements, more parts to it than ever before. And,
therefore, it is harder to keep everything adjusted-and harder
to find out where the trouble lies when the machine gets out
of order. You know that one of the interesting things that Mr.
Jefferson said in those early days of simplicity which marked
the beginnings of our government was that the best government
consisted in as little governing as possible. And there is still a
sense in which that is true. It is still intolerable for the government to interfere with our individual activities except where it
is necessary to interfere with them in order to free them. But I
feel confident that if Jefferson were living today he would see
what we see: that the individual is caught in a great confused
nexus of all sorts of complicated circumstances, and that to let
him alone is to leave him helpless as against the obstacles with
which he has to contend; and that, therefore, law in our day must
come to the assistance of the individual. It must come to his
assistance to see that he gets fair play; that is all, but that is
much. Without the watchful interference, the resolute interference, of the government, there can be no fair play between
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individuals and such powerful institutions as the trusts. Freedom today is something more than being let alone. The program
of a government of freedom must in these days be positive, not
negative merely. 8
The governments gradually came to realize the appalling number of deaths and injuries that arose yearly in
the great factories and began to inquire as to the recourse
that the worker had for such injuries as he sustained.
It was found that the "let alone" policy had so infected
the minds of the employers and the courts that the
worker not only had to take the employment if, as, when,
and under such conditions as the employer wished to furnish and exact, but also that the employee was forced to
bear the burden of proof in establishing the liability of
the employer in case he did receive an injury of any
kind during the course of his employment. Even within
this limited field in which the employer could be held
liable, he had in aid of his position those three common
law defenses which were so valuable-contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant doctrine. Clearly the workman had a very expensive addition to his welfare in such a case. It was as a substitute
for such an inequitable system that workmen's compensation acts finally came into existence.
The principles underlying workmen's compensation
are: First, the employer is automatically responsible for
the financial loss to the worker arising from all accidents
within the industry; second, industrial accidents should
be reckoned as a part of the cost of production; therefore, the employer is expected to shift, if possible, the
cost to the consumer. These principles will be more fully
illustrated by the discussion of the cases which will follow, and they are mentioned here merely to enable us
better to understand the background of the acts themselves. The scope of the present acts is quite varied;
some laws cover practically the whole range of industrial
employments, others are limited to what are commonly
4
known as hazardous or extrahazardous employments.
3

4

Ibid., p. 614.
Gordon S. Watkins, Labor Problems (1929), p. 340.
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Stated broadly, our present quest is, the ascertainment
of the extent to which the workmen's compensation acts
of one state are recognized and enforced in the courts of
its sister states. 'The answer falls into two main
divisions: First, to what extent will one state enforce the
act of another state when the accident occurs inside of
its own boundaries although the contract of employment
was made in another state; second, to what extent will
a state enforce its own act when the accident occurs outside of its own boundaries. Within each of these divisions
there is a great deal of conflict in the decisions of the
various states; so great, in fact, is the variance, that the
Minnesota5 and Iowa6 courts have openly declared that
a discussion of the decisions of other states will be of
little value in determining the operation of their own
statutes; that different arguments appeal to different
courts. Hence, we must necessarily direct our attention
to the arguments which have caused the courts of one
state to reach one conclusion and of other states to
reach another. It must be pointed out that the type of
the act, whether elective or compulsory, the place where
the contract of employment was entered into, the place
where the parties resided, and the place where the work
is to be performed are all factors which must be considered in determining the extent of application of the
particular act. It must be remembered also that the
specific provisions of the statute in any state will distinctly affect the conclusion reached in that particular
jurisdiction. From these considerations we will turn
to the operation of state acts where there is a Federal
statute, and then will conclude with a review of the
cases which have arisen in the Illinois courts involving
any of these situations.
Even now, with the statement of the problem before
us, we should not proceed before the following settled
principles of conflict of laws have been reiterated: First,
5 State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, 139 Minn.
205, 166 N. W. 185 (1918).
6 Pierce v. Bekins Van and Storage Company, 185 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W.
191 (1919).
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the law of the place where the accident occurred will control a tort action in regard to the measure of damages,
the party entitled to maintain the action, the beneficiaries
of the action, and all other questions of substantive law
which determine whether or not there has in fact been a
tort committed ;7 second, the law of the place where the
contract was made will determine all questions of essential validity of the contract, unless it is to be entirely performed in another place, in which case the law of the
place of performance will govern;" third, the statutes of
another state are only enforced because of comity and are
not entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution
of the United States.
DIFFERENCE IN APPLICATION OF ELECTIVE AND

COMPULSORY ACTS

Courts base their reasoning not only on the rules of
conflict of laws in applying an act to cases involving the
problem of its extraterritorial effect but also upon matters of expediency. By that is meant only that the courts
have held their statutes to apply to injuries occurring
outside the state, because they have felt that it would be
contrary to the intentions of the legislatures which passed
them to hold otherwise. The theory of such cases is
that accidents are to be considered as a cost or expense
of carrying on the business, and that the work done under
the contract of employment is just as beneficial to the
employer when it is. consummated beyond the state lines
as when it is entirely performed within the boundaries of
the state. 10 The courts have also said that the fact that
the amount paid into the compensation fund by the employer is based upon the total salaries which he pays,
regardless of where the work is done, makes it hardly
7 Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 56 L. Ed. 274 (1912).
8 Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
9 Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308 (1884); Doherty v.
The American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619 (1912). But see
"The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts," 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383.
10 Post v. Burgher and Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916).
The
court also said that the idea of the act was to prevent dependents of such
injured persons from becoming subjects of charity, and that such danger was
just as great if the accident occurred out of the state as in it.
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believable that merely crossing the state line temporarily
would deprive the employee of that protection intended
to be afforded by the statute."
In the Nebraska case of McGuire v. Phelaon-Shirley
Company, 2 the contract was made in Nebraska, and the
injury was sustained in the state of Iowa. Compensation
was allowed under the Nebraska act, the court saying,
The Workmen's Compensation Act is one of general interest, not
only to the workman and his employer, but as well to the state,
and it should be so construed that technical refinements of interpretation will not be permitted to defeat it.

One of the best examples of such expeditious reasoning
is to be found in Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Company," here quoted:
As has been said, the Workmen's Compensation Act is based
upon the economic theory that it is in the interest of the general
welfare that damages arising from injuries sustained by persons
engaged in a particular industry shall be borne by that industry.
The liability of the employer at common law was limited to cases
where negligence could be established. Where negligence was
established, the burden was borne in the first instance by the
employer, who ordinarily had an opportunity to pass all or a part
of the burden on. In cases where negligence could not be established, the injured employee bore the entire burden, with no
opportunity to pass it on. Under the Workmen's Compensation
Act the burden falls upon society at large, and is not borne
entirely either by the employer or by the employee. If the application of the law be limited to injuries occurring within this
state, then in the case of injuries sustained without the state
the employer will not be liable, except he be negligent, and where
he is not negligent the whole loss must be borne by the employee,
and the whole legislative purpose is, as to injuries sustained
11 Spratt v. Sweeny and Gray Co., 153 N. Y. S. 505 (1915) ; Post v. Burgher
and Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916) ; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372 (1915); Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron
Company, 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275 (1919) ; Pierce v. Bekins Van and
Storage Co., 185 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W. 191 (1919) ; State ex rel. Chambers v.
District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185 (1918).
12 111 Neb. 609, 197 N. W. 615 (1924).
1a 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275.
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without the state, defeated. We have extensive borders; thousands of employees are passing out of and into Wisconsin daily,
and almost hourly, in the discharge of their ordinary duties.
Can it be that the legislature intended that every time these
employees crossed the state line their right to compensation for
injuries incidental to and growing out of their employment
should be changed, and that as to injuries which occur beyond
the state line the old system instead of the new should apply?
If the Workmen's Compensation Acts of the several states are
to be given effect, so as to make them general in their application,
they must be held to apply to injuries to employees wherever
they occur. If accidents occurring without the state are to be
in one class, and accidents occurring within the state are to be in
another class, every state might have a workmen's compensation
act, and yet both the old and the new systems would still be in
force, and the legislative purpose would not be accomplished.
The construction here placed upon the act will give the legislative intent full effect, and if recognized by the courts of sister
states, will give every employee the remedy provided by the
Workmen's Compensation Act under which his contract of employment was made.
In other states less reliance is placed on expeditious
reasoning and more is placed on the principle of conflict
of laws. In the application of these principles it is deemed
necessary to distinguish in construction and application
between acts which are optional and those which are
compulsory. One, eminent text writer says that
it may be stated on the weight of authority that acts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of
unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury
occurs outside the state, while, on the other hand, acts construed
to be contractual protect one injured outside the state, where
the contract of employment was made within the state and is
14
governed by the laws of the state.
Hence, it may be said that the general rule is that
where the provisions of the act are optional, the relationship is contractual as to parties who have accepted its
14Arthur B. Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, (Kansas City, Missouri:
Vernon Law Book Co., 1917) I, par. 8.
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provisions, and hence that it makes no difference where
the injury occurs, if the court is applying the statute of
its own jurisdiction, 5 and sometimes even when it is
applying that of another jurisdiction, but where the
statute is compulsory, it cannot be considered contractual, and, hence, it is not generally held to apply to
injuries occurring outside the state. 6
In State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Company v. Missouri Compensation Commission, 7 the contract of employment was entered into in Missouri, and the parties
had elected to come under the provisions of the act, which
was elective. The Missouri court held that therefore the
Missouri act had become a part of the contract and would
thus be applied and enforced wherever the contract was
enforced, regardless of where the injury occurred. In the
New York case of Barnhartv. American Steel Company,"
the court discussed the question at length and finally
arrived at this conclusion:
The New Jersey statute is different. Under that statute the
rights which it creates and the duties which it imposes are contractual in the strict sense. It is optional with the employer, as
well as the employee, whether or not the compensation, in case
of injury or death, shall be paid. If a servant prefers to retain
his common-law remedies he may give notice within a certain
time after his employment, and the remedies will be retained.
If he chooses to renounce them in return for the statutory scheme
15 Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W. 204 (1921),
followed in Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 411
(1922), where the court said that since the act was voluntary it was part of the
contract, and so could be enforced wherever the contract could.
16 "Where the statute compels submission by the employer and employee,
there is no contract, as a- general rule, enforceable outside of the state. But
where . . . the statute makes acceptance optional, and the parties freely enter
into the contract of employment with reference to the statute, the statute
should be read into the contract as an integral part thereof, binding the
parties, and enforceable in any jurisdiction the same as any other contract."
Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862 (1916). See also Foughty v. Ott,
80 W. Va. 88, 92 S. E. 143 (1917); In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E.
693 (1913) ; Union Bridge and Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 Ill.
396, 122 N. E. 609 (1919) ; North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1,
162 P. 93 (1916).
17 320 Mo. 893, 8 S. W. (2d) 897 (1928).
18 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (1920).
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of compensation, his voluntary choice is the source and origin
of his right.
The plaintiff's intestate, having the right to accept or reject
the statutory scheme of compensation, exercised the option to
accept it, and contracted accordingly with the defendant. Such
contract became binding upon him, and, like any other valid contract, enforceable in the State of New York, unless opposed to its
public policy.
The Indiana court held that it had jurisdiction of an
injury sustained in Indiana even though the contract of
employment, made in Ohio, was to be performed in the
District of Columbia, on the ground that the employer,
an Indiana corporation, had not elected not to be bound
by the act of the District, and hence was presumed to
have accepted it and to have made it a part of the contract. 9 Rhode Island" holds that under its statute the
relation of employer and employee is contractual and
therefore it matters not where the accident happens. The
Washington court has gone so far as to say that not only
does the act itself become a part of the contract when
it is of the elective type, but that all constructions placed
upon the act by the supreme
court of the state also be21
come a part of the contract.
On the other hand, in Arizona, where the statute is, construed to be compulsory, it has been held in regard to
Arizona injuries that the local statute must apply regardless of where performance is to take place or where the
contract was made.22 California 23 and Oklahoma,2 4 like19 Carl Hagenbeck and Great Wallace Show Co. v. Randall, 75 Ind. App.
417, 126 N. E. 501 (1920); Carl Hagenbeck, etc. v. Ball, 75 Ind. App. 454,
126 N. E. 504 (1920); Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Americanische P. A. G., 138
N. Y. S. 944 (1912). The German act was a bar to a recovery under the
New York statute when the contract was made in Germany and had special
compensation provided. But the New York court enforced the German act.
These cases are fine examples of the extraterritorial recognition of a foreign
compensation act under the guise of enforcing a contract.
20 Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 A. 103 (1916).
21 Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 P. 773 (1924).
22 Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 32 Ariz.
275, 257 P. 644 (1927).
23 North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93 (1916).
24 Sheehan Pipe Line Construction Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 151
Okla. 272, 3 P. (2d) 199 (1931); Continental Oil Company v. Pitts, 158
Okla. 200, 13 P. (2d) 180 (1932).
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wise hold that where the act is compulsory, its provisions
arise not by contract, and therefore, it must be construed
as any other statute is construed, and in order to operate
as to injuries occurring outside the state there must be
clearly expressed in the statute such intention.
In the case of Altman v. North Dakota Compensation
Bureau,25 we find one of the best, although not one of the
most recent, examples, of this type of case. The plaintiff
was hired by one Pifer to work in North Dakota. When
his work on that job was finished, he entered into another
contract with Pifer for work to be performed in Montana
or Washington. Pifer had paid the plaintiff for the first
job but had not paid his compensation insurance for that
job. He had, however, paid insurance for the men in
Washington, the state in which the plaintiff was injured.
The North Dakota court held for the compensation
bureau on the ground that since the North Dakota authorities could not collect premiums for work done in
Washington, it should not be liable for injuries sustained
there. "In general, the field within which compensable
injuries arise should be coterminous with the field within
which premiums may be collected in order to create the
compensation fund."6 The North Dakota act was there
held to be compulsory.
In summary, then, it is quite clear that the greatest
latitude is allowed in those states in which the acts are
construed to be elective and voluntary; therefore, the
major part of this study will deal with the various rules
of conflict of laws as they are applied to such elective
acts.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS APPLICABLE.

To actions brought in the various states to recover
under workmen's compensation acts, the courts in the
main, apply the same rules of conflict of laws as are fol2550 N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287 (1923),
(footnote 16) since overruled; Union Bridge
(footnote 16) since overruled; and Perlis v.
decided on a different point.
26 Altman v. North Dakota Compensation
287 (1923).

citing to sustain it, In re Gould
and Const. Co. v. Industrial Com.
Lederer, 178 N. Y. S. 449 (1919)
Bureau, 50 N. D. 215, 195 N. W.
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lowed in the enforcement of most other types of contracts
-the law of the place where the contract is made will
govern, unless the entire performance is to take place
elsewhere, in which case the lex solutionis will govern.
As we shall see, many states prefer to follow the lex loci
contractus,even though the contract is, in some instances,
entirely to be, performed at another place.
In Kenmerson v. Thames Towboat Company,2 7 the
plaintiff's intestate entered into the contract of employment with the defendant in Connecticut for employment
that was to take place in that state, on the high seas, and
in, or on, the waters of some of the other states. While
in the course of his employment on waters controlled
by New York, the plaintiff's intestate was drowned. The
Connecticut court held that since the contract was made
in Connecticut, the Connecticut (elective) act became a
part of the contract and that the lex loci contractus
governed.
New York, applying its compulsory act, has given us
a varied group of decisions on this subject. When all of
the cases are considered together and analyzed, it quite
definitely appears that the place where the contract was
entered into is the controlling factor and not the place
where the performance is to take place. Hence, in State
Industrial Commission v. Barene,8 where the contract
was to be entirely performed in Connecticut, and the
injury was sustained in that state, the New York court
held that the New York act should apply, because the
contract was entered into in the latter state. The same
court, in Baggs v. Standard Oil Company," held that the
New York act did not apply where the contract was made
out of the: state, the entire performance was to take place
elsewhere, the injury occurred elsewhere, and the injured
27 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372 (1915); Pettit v. T. J. Pardy Const. Co., 103
Conn. 101, 130 A. 70 (1925), where the Connecticut act applied to an injury
received outside the state in the case of performance to be done outside the
state, but the contract was entered into within the state; Falvey v. Sprague

Meter Co., Ill Conn. 693, 151 A. 182 (1930),

held that the Connecticut act

applied although performance was outside the state.

28 177 N. Y. S. 689 (1919).
29 180 N. Y. S. 560 (1920).
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party was not a New York resident. It has also held"0
that the fact that the main place of business of the employer was in New York made no difference if the contract was made, the performance was to take place, and
the injury occurred all in another state. In Madderas v.
Fox Films Corporation,31 where the contract was made
in New York, and the performance (outside the state)
from which the accident arose was merely temporary and
incidental to the main performance within the state,
the court held that the New York act did not apply. And
in the recent case of Properv. Polly,32 the injury occurred
in the state of New York, but the court held that the New
York act did not apply, because the contract of employment was made in Pennsylvania, and the work in New
York was temporary in character. In New York, where
the contract is made in the state and it is clear that the
entire performance is to take place in another jurisdiction, the New York act is held to be inapplicable ;33 and,
in any event, before the New York act is held to apply,
the work must be incidental to a general employment in
that state. 4
California and Georgia, also having compulsory acts,
apply them in the same way.3 5 Hence, in Georgia, the
local act would apply in cases of foreign injuries, if the
contract was made in Georgia and the main performance
was to take place there.
In West Virginia, where the act is elective, it was held
that the lex loci contractus was the controlling law in a
case where the contract was entered into in West Virginia
and the injured person was injured in the Maryland part
3OThompson v. Foundation Co., 177 N. Y. S. 58 (1919).
31 200 N. Y. S. 344 (1923). See also Donahue v. H. H. Robertson Co., 199
N. Y. S. 470 (1923), where the same principle is announced but where the
evidence was held insufficient. There was also an insufficiency of evidence in
Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co., 206 N. Y. S. 458 (1924).
32 253 N. Y. S. 530 (1931).
33 Baum v. N. Y. Air Terminals, 245 N. Y. S. 357

(1930); Gardener v.
Horseheads Construction Co., 156 N. Y. S. 899 (1916) ; Smith v. Heine Safety
Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9, 119 N. E. 878 (1918) ; Perlis v. Lederer, 178 N. Y. S.
449 (1919).
34 Kalfatis v. Commercial Painting Co., 254 N. Y. S. 519 (1931).
35 North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93 (1916);
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S. E. 121 (1928).
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of a mine which underlay both Maryland and West Virginia.3 6 Minnesota, which likewise has an elective act,
has held that the employee of a corporation having its
northwest business localized in Minneapolis, the contract
of hiring being completed in Minnesota, and the work
being performed incidental to employment in Minnesota,
could recover under the Minnesota act, although the
injury occurred outside the state. 7 Nebraska has placed
its decisions under its elective act squarely on the lex
loci contractus. In McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Company,"
the recovery was allowed under the act of Nebraska,
where the contract of hiring was made, although the performance in which the injury was received was executed
in another state. The court said: "The Workmen's
Compensation Act is one of general interest, not only to
the workman and his employer, but as well to the state,
and it should be so construed that technical refinements
of interpretation will not be permitted to defeat it."
The same rule was applied in Skelly Oil Company v.
Gaugenbaugh,39 and more rightly, perhaps, because the
outside employment was only of a temporary nature.
Iowa also is in accord with these principles.4"
Missouri, where the act is elective, is decidedly in favor
of applying only the lex loci contractus. Recovery was
allowed under the Missouri act where the employer was
a Missouri corporation and the contract was made in
Missouri, even though all of the sales work of the plaintiff was to be done out of the state. 4 In State ex rel.
36 Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862 (1916); Foughty v. Ott, 80
W. Va. 88, 92 S. E. 143 (1917).
37 Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N. W. 977 (1921)
State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, 139 Minn. 205,
166 N. W. 185 (1918) ; Ginsburg v. Byers, 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55 (1927) ;
Bradtmiller v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 173 Minn. 481, 217 N. W. 680 (1928), providing the entire performance is not to take place outside of the state.
38 111 Neb. 609, 197 N. W. 615 (1924).
39 119 Neb. 698, 230 N. W. 688 (1930).
40 Pierce v. Bekins Van and Storage Co., 185 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W. 191
(1919).
41 Zarnecke v. Blue Line Chemical Co., 54 S. W. (2d) 772 (Mo. App. 1932)
Muse v. Whitney & Son, 56 S. W. (2d) 848 (Mo. App. 1933) ; and Shout v.
Gunite Concrete and Construction Co., 41 S. W. (2d) 629 (Mo. App. 1931),
where the injured party was only temporarily out of the state.
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Brewen-Clark Syrup Company v. Missouri Compensation
Commission,4 2 the contract was made in Missouri; so the
court held that the Missouri Compensation Act became
a part of the contract and would be applied no matter
where the accident happened.
In Wisconsin the act is elective. The courts there
apply the lex loci contractus but in addition are influenced by the fact that either the plaintiff or his employer is a resident of the state. For example, in Thresherman's National Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission" and in Van Blatz Brewing Company v. Gerard,"
it was held that the act of Wisconsin may even apply
where no services are to be performed within the state
provided the contract was made there and both of the
parties. were residents. In Interstate Power Company v.
Industrial Commission4 5 the court held the act applied;
in Wandersee v. Moskewitz,"4 it held that the Wisconsin
act did not apply, the only difference between the two
cases being that in the latter case the plaintiff was not a
citizen of Wisconsin, while in the former case he was.
The rule stated in these cases is extended in the more
recent case of McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Company v.
Industrial Commission,4 7 where the court said that the
controlling factor was whether or not the party had
acquired- a status as an employee within the state, and
that it did, not matter where the contract was made or
whether or not the plaintiff was a resident of the state.
In the last mentioned case, the contract of hire was made
in Illinois between an Illinois employer and employee,
and the injury was received while in the state of Illinois;
42 320 Mo. 893, 8 S. W. (2d) 897 (1928).
43 201 Wis. 303, 230 N. W. 67 (1930).
44201 Wis. 474, 230 N. W. 622 (1930).
45203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889 (1931).
46 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837 (1929).
47212 Wis. 507, 250 N. W. 396 (1933).
See also Zurich Accident and
Liability Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 193 Wis. 32, 213 N. W. 630
(1927), where an employee of a Wisconsin company and under a Wisconsin
contract went to another state and had charge of hiring and firing employees
and took out compensation for such employees under the acts of such other
states. The court held that he was still subject to the Wisconsin act because
his services grew out of and were incidental to his Wisconsin employment.
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however, the sales territory (place where the contract
was to be performed) was Wisconsin. Hence, in Wisconsin, nothing more is needed to invoke the Wisconsin act
than an employee status there.
The Michigan court said that all that was necessary
was that the contract be made in the state and the
employer be found there, even though the employment is
to be entirely performed elsewhere."
The Michigan act
is elective. In Colorado, the test under its elective statute
seems to be a Colorado contract plus a substantial portion of the services performed in that state.4 9 The general rule of the lex loci contractus is followed under elective acts in Louisiana, 50 Maine, 51 Massachusetts,5 2 Indiana,53 Rhode Island,54 and Montana;55 and it is also followed in the Federal courts.5 6 Therefore, it can be seen
48 Roberts v. I. X. L. Glass Corp., 259 Mich. 644, 244 N. W. 188 (1932) ; this
case was followed in Wearner v. Michigan Conference, S. D. A., 260 Mich. 540,
245 N. W. 802 (1932), on almost identical facts; and in two earlier cases,
Klettke v. C. and J. Commercial Driveway, 250 Mich. 454, 231 N. W. 132
(1930), and Deakins v. C. and J. Commercial Driveway, 250 Mich. 572, 231
N. W. 133 (1930), the same rule was laid down where the accident was sustained while only temporarily within another state.
49 Hall v. Industrial Commission, 77 Colo. 338, 235 P. 1073 (1925); Home
Insurance Co. v. Hepp, 91 Colo. 495, 15 P. (2d) 1082 (1932).
50 Selser v. Bragman's Bluff Lumber Co., 146 So. 690 (La. 1933) ; Festervand
v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634 (1930).
51 Saunder's Case, 126 Me. 144, 136 A. 722 (1927).
52 Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933); McLaughlin's Case,
274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931); Pedersoli's Case, 269 Mass. 550, 169
N. E. 427 (1930). It is interesting to note that between the date of In re
Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913), and that of these other three
cases a change was made in the Massachusetts statute which permitted recovery under the statute for injuries received outside the state provided only
that the contract of hire was made in Massachusetts and the services were to be
performed for a Massachusetts employer. Prior to such change Gould's Case
had been cited as an authority in almost every state in the union to support
the doctrine that the benefits of the act should apply to purely local injuries.
The result was completely to remove this precedent and to cause Massachusetts
to fall in line with the majority of the states. It is interesting to note, too, that
it required a legislative act to do this-a liberal construction by the courts
could not accomplish it.
53 Bement Oil Corp. v. Cubbison, 84 Ind. App. 22, 149 N. E. 919 (1925);
Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Fireworks Display Co., 77 Ind. App. 357, 133 N. E.
525 (1922) ; Johns-Manville v. Thrane, 80 Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229 (1923).
54 Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 A. 103 (1916).
55 State ex rel. Loney v. State Industrial Accident Board, 87 Mont. 191,
286 P. 408 (1930).
56 In re Spencer Kellogg and Sons, 52 F. (2d) 129 (1931) ; Scott v. White
Eagle Oil and Refining Co., 47 F. (2d) 615 (1930).
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readily that a number of courts (although not the majority) hold that an elective act becomes a part of the
contract, and that when the contract is made within their
particular jurisdiction such act will be enforced regardless of where the accident took place, even if the entire
performance is to take place outside the state boundaries.
As has been intimated before, some courts stray from
the rule of the lex loci contractus in cases where all of
the performance, by the terms of the contract, is to occur
at a location different from that at which the contract
itself was actually entered into. As a matter of conflict
of laws, this is not in the least strange, since. all cause or
right to presume that the parties to the contract intended
to act with reference to the law of the place where the
contract was made naturally fails. There is, in truth, no
longer any necessity for such a presumption, since the
parties have dispelled it by the wording of the contract.
Therefore, the courts, and by far the majority of them,
have held that the law of the place where the entire performance is to take place must determine all questions of
validity and legal obligations-an application of the lex
solutionis 7 Two states have held that their respective
acts would apply chiefly because of the fact that the defendant corporation was, in each case, located in the
state or had its principal place of business there; and
therefore the last act necessary to complete the contract
57 Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Company, 119 Me. 552, 112 A. 516 (1921) ;
Empire Glass and Decoration Co. v. Bussey, 33 Ga. App. 464, 126 S. E. 912
(1925); Saunder's Case, 126 Me. 144, 136 A. 722 (1927) ; Bradtmiller v.
Liquid Carbonic Co., 173 Minn. 481, 217 N. W. 680 (1928) ; Gardner v. Horseheads Construction Company, 156 N. Y. S. 899 (1916); Baum v. N. Y. Air
Terminals, 245 N. Y. S. 357 (1930) ; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Gardinio,
119 Ohio St. 539, 164 N. E. 758 (1929) ; Platt v. Reynolds, 86 Colo. 397, 282
P. 264 (1929); Tripp v. Industrial Commission, 89 Colo. 512, 4 P. (2d) 917
(1931); Liggett and Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 160 A. 804
(1932); Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 466, 234
N. W. 889 (1931); Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N. W. 410 (1928);
American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 A. 85 (1914), followed in
Davidheiser v. Hay Foundry and Iron Works, 87 N. J. L. 688, 94 A. 1103,
94 A. 309 (1914); West Jersey Trust Co. v. Philadelphia and R. Ry. Co., 88
N. J. L. 102, 95 A. 753 (1915).
The Federal court in American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. McCaffrey, 37 F. (2d) 870 (1930), says that where the
contract is to be wholly performed in a place other than where it was made,
the lex solutionis applies,
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had to be done within their boundaries. 8 But on the
whole, it can safely be said that the foregoing two general
rules of conflict of laws are followed in most of the
states.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ACTS

As may be gathered from the cases already cited,
most states have treated the obligations arising under
workmen's compensation acts as being contractual and
have enforced them or refused to enforce them according to the laws pertaining to contracts, but a few states,
even as late as 1925, have persisted in regarding such
acts purely as statutes and enforcing them as such; they
look at the injury received as a tort and not a breach of
contract.59 In these cases it is the act of the state where
the injury occurred that is being considered and not the
local act or the act of the state where the contract was
made (unless the injury occurs there); consequently no
distinction is made between elective and compulsory statutes. Therefore, there must have been a cause of action
in the place where the injury occurred, or the court in
such case will not grant relief. Of course, the general
rule in regard to the enforcement in one state of the
statutes of any other state is that the enforcement depends entirely upon the doctrine of comity and that it
will not be enforced if it contravenes the positive law
or settled public policy of the forum. Since the courts
which have acted in this manner are in the minority, it
will avail us little to go on with a consideration of their
decisions.
INJURIES INCURRED ON UNITED STATES PROPERTY

One phase of the question with which we must concern
ourselves briefly is the effect of the Federal Employers'
58 Brameld v. Albert Dickinson Co., 186 Minn. 89, 242 N. W. 465 (1932) ;
Stone v. Thompson Co., 124 Neb. 181, 245 N. W. 600 (1932). The statutes
in both of these states are elective.

59 Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S. W. 21 (1925);
Harbis v. Cudahy Packing Co., 211 Mo. App. 188, 241 S. W. 960 (1921);
Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 254, 58 L. Ed. 997 (1914)
Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 53 L. Ed. 695 (1909).
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Liability Act upon injuries incurred on property belonging to the United States or being used by the United
States for a particular purpose. In such a situation, is
the Federal act or the state act the one which will govern
the right of the injured party to recover compensation
from his employer? The better opinion today, regardless of what it might have been in the past, seems to be
that the state act will apply to injuries arising out of a
contract pertaining to such property.
In State v. Wiles," the plantiff was hired for the purpose of carrying mail from a main post office to various
sub-stations. He had to use his own car and furnish his
own, license. The court held that the plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an employee of the Federal
government, and that therefore the state and not the
Federal act must furnish him any relief to which he
would be entitled. In State ex rel. Loney v. State Industrial Accident Board,61 the plaintiff and the defendant,
both residents of the state of Montana, contracted to
build a road in Glacier National Park, which was located
partly in the state of Montana and partly in lands donated by the state to the national government for park
purposes. The injury was received on that part of the
road, which was located in the United States grant, and
the court held that the state act extended to such injuries, saying that it was not the intention of the legislature that the compensation should cease in a case like
62
that. In Mickell v. Department of Labor and Industries,
the court held the state act to apply in an analogous situation where the parties were engaged in the construction
of a bridge in a national park. Massachusetts held the
same way in Lynch's Case,63 but its reasons are different.
Lynch worked for the N. P. Severin Company, general
contractors, in the construction of a new Federal post
office in Boston, and the contract of hire was entered into
60 116 Wash. 387, 199 P. 749 (1921).
6187 Mont. 191, 286 P. 408 (1930).
62 164 Wash. 589, 3 P. (2d)

1005 (1931).

63281 Mass. 454, 183 N. E. 834 (1933).
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in Massachusetts. The ground on which the post office
was being built belonged to the United States government, and Lynch's duties carried him onto this property
as well as onto the adjacent property belonging to the
state. The injury was received while Lynch was actually
working on the Federal property. The sole defense interposed by the defendant was that since the accident
occurred on land owned by the United States and under
its sole control and jurisdiction, the state act could not
apply. The court granted compensation to Lynch, reasoning that since the Massachusetts statute provided for
compensation no matter where the accident took place if
the contract was made in the state, and since the contract
was made in the state of Massachusetts, the plaintiff
could recover there. In other words, the court treats
Federal land within a state just as though it were the
land of another state. The decision seems absolutely
sound. The most recent case on the question, Murray v.
Gerrick and Company, 4 holds differently, however, on
very much the same state of facts. In 1891, the state of
Montana ceded to the Federal government a tract of land
to be used as a navy yard and yielded jurisdiction to it.
The plaintiff was erecting a crane for his employer on
this property at the time of the accident which resulted
in his death. The court held that a demurrer to the
complaint was rightly sustained, because the state act
could not have any effect over accidents occurring on
property controlled by the Federal government. There is
the additional factor in this case that the state compensation act was not in force at the time the property was
ceded to the Federal government, and also the fact that
the action was brought by the widow and not by the
personal representative; hence, it was unnecessary to
consider the point in question.
Two other lines of cases exist in which it is held that
the right to recover under Federal and not state acts
cannot be disputed. The first of these is where the employee happened to be engaged in interstate commerce
64291

U. S. 315, 78 L. Ed. 821 (1934).
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at the time the accident occurred. The states are nearly
all in accord, in such a case, in holding that where the
employee is engaged in interstate commerce he has no
right to recover under the act of the state in which the
injury occurred. The rule is clearly stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Industrial
Board,65 although in that case the court felt that the facts
did not justify such a finding and gave judgment to the
plaintiff. The same rule has also been enunciated in
New 9 York,6 Wisconsin,67 West Virginia, 68 and Washing6
ton.
The other line of cases before referred to is that which
concerns the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Probably the most recent case in which the question was
raised is Ciaramitaro'sCase.7 The workman was hired
in Boston by a fishing company operating out of that city
in the business of catching crabs in Boston Harbor and
the surrounding waters. The work was done by the use
of nets, which were placed at various spots in the water.
It was the duty of the deceased to go out in a boat and
hook these nets at certain intervals and to empty them,
leaving them there for future catchings. At the time
of the accident which resulted in his death, he was in
the act of hooking one of these nets from a small boat in
which he was working. The hook slipped, and he fell
into the water and was drowned. The court held that
the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act did
not apply, because the accident occurred within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts, and it
cited a number of Federal decisions to sustain its views,
among which were the cases of Spencer Kellogg and Sons
v. Hicks71 and London Guarantee and Accident Company,
72
Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California.
65273 Ill. 528, 113 N. E. 80 (1916).
66 Parsons v. Delaware and H. Company, 216 N. Y. 710, 111 N. E. 1093
(1915).
67 Sullivan v. Chicago M. and St. P. Ry., 163 Wis. 583, 158 N. W. 321 (1916).
68 Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659 (1916).
69 State v. Bates and Rogers Const. Co., 91 Wash. 181, 157 P. 482 (1916).
70 193 N. E. 4 (Mass., 1934).
71285 U. S. 502, 76 L. Ed. 903 (1931).
72 279 U. S. 109, 73 L. Ed. 632 (1928).
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In the latter case, the court considered all the cases
that had arisen in the United States Supreme Court up
to that time and clearly stated the principle involved and
the way it had been treated. In the London Guarantee
case, John Brooke was engaged by Morris Pleasure Fishing, Inc., a company which carried on the business of
maintaining and operating from Santa Monica Bay a
small fleet of fishing vessels for the accommodation of the
public seeking recreation in deep-sea fishing. Brooke,
who was an apprentice seaman, was trying to save a
vessel which had broken loose from her moorings during
a storm. The small boat which he, with two other men,
was using, capsized, and all three were drowned. The
court held that the employment of the deceased was
clearly maritime in its nature and that there could be no
recovery under the state compensation act. A review of
the cases cited 73 in this latter decision discloses that the
state acts can have absolutely no application where the
accident is a maritime accident and within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States courts.
Whether or not the facts actually do bring the case
within the admiralty jurisdiction is a preliminary question, which must be decided on the facts, before any relief
may be given, and the deciding question here is: Is the
employment or activity at the time of the injury directly
related to navigation ? It is not necessary that the business be for commerce rather than for pleasure, that the
business be foreign or interstate, or that the person in73 Southern P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1916) ; Clyde
Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255, 61 L. Ed. 1116 (1916); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. Ed. 834 (1919); Union Fish Co. v.
Erickson, 248 U. S. 308, 63 L. Ed. 261 (1918) ; Washington v. Dawson and Co.,
264 U. S. 219, 68 L. Ed. 646 (1924); Robbins Dry Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S.
449, 69 L. Ed. 372 (1924), where the tort was held to be maritime when it was
suffered by one doing repair work on a completed vessel; Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 66 L. Ed. 321 (1921), where the employment
was held to have no direct relation to navigation when the work was on an
incompleted vessel, even though the vessel was lying in navigable water;
Miller's Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, 70 L. Ed. 470 (1925) ;
Sultan Ry. & T. Co. v. Department of Labor and Ind., 277 U. S. 135, 72 L. Ed.
820 (1927); Smith and Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179, 72 L. Ed. 520 (1927).
It is interesting to compare the latter case with the Murray case cited in footnote 64. In each case the injury occurred on dry land, but opposite results
are reached.
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jured be a passenger on the boat instead of a seaman.
A determining factor that must also be considered is
whether or not the accident occurred on the high seas or
navigable waters, since such fact is very strong evidence
that the employment was directly related to navigation.
Aside from the cases discussed in this section, however,
there seems to be no exception to the general application of the state acts to accidents, occurring within state
boundaries.
In summary, then, it may be said that the compensation act of the state in which the contract was made or
the injury occurred will be applied except in these three
cases: First, where the injured party is an employee of
the Federal government; second, where the employee is
engaged in interstate commerce at the time; and, third,
where the accident arises under such circumstances as
bring it within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal
courts. In most cases these will be jurisdictional questions, but they may conceivably have a bearing on the
relief obtained.
ILLINOIS

DECISIONS

Few cases are to be found in the Illinois reports bearing upon the question of the applicability of the state
Workmen's Compensation Act to injuries which happened outside of the state, and the decisions of those
found seem to rest entirely on the provisions of the
Illinois act. The first case in which the question appears
to have been raised is Friedmai,ManufacturingCompany
v. Industrial Commission.74 This case. has been cited by
the courts in later cases as bearing on the point, but in
reality it decides nothing of value in that regard. The
duties of the deceased, Melvin Goodrode, a traveling
salesman for the plaintiff, Friedman Manufacturing
Company, took him to various places in the states of
Illinois and Indiana. While he was driving his car in
Indiana, the car went down an embankment into a pond
of water, and Goodrode was drowned. The defendant
74 284 Il.

554, 120 N. E. 460 (1918).
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raised the point that the Industrial Board was in error
in awarding compensation, because the accident occurred
outside of the state of Illinois. The statute provided,
however, that the judgment of the Industrial Commission
should be binding unless certiorari was issued within
twenty days. In the present case, it was not issued
within the required time, and so the Supreme Court
merely affirmed the award of the Industrial Commission
without discussing the merits, of the case.
In the prior case of HarvesterCo. v. IndustrialBoard,7
the deceased died in Michigan as a result of a bus accident. 'The award of the commission was reversed by
the Supreme Court on the ground that the accident did
not arise out of, and in the course of, the worker's employment, and hence it was unnecessary for it to decide
definitely whether or not the act applied to out-of-state
injuries.
In 1919, the point was first actually raised and passed
upon in the case of Union Bridge Company v. Industrial
Commission.76 The plaintiff in error was engaged in constructing a railroad bridge across the Ohio River from
Metropolis, Illinois, to the Kentucky shore. The construction gang, working on a bridge pier, 1185 feet south
of the low water mark of the Illinois shore, was taking
out sand and mud to sink a caisson in the river. One of
the men, an Eloy Williams, while attempting to cross a
gangplank connecting the pier with a barge, fell into the
river and was drowned. An award was allowed. The
plaintiff in error contended that the Circuit Court erred
in holding the Workmen's Compensation Act to apply
to injuries occurring outside the state. The act at that
time was entitled, "An act to promote the general welfare
of the people of this state by providing compensation for
accidental injuries or deaths suffered in the course of
employment within the state." Holding that this statute
was the same as that which existed in Massachusetts at
the time In re Gould77 was decided, the Illinois Court
75282 111. 489, 118 N. E. 711 (1918).

76287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 609 (1919).
7215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913).
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likewise ruled that the act did not apply to accidents
arising outside the state. However, though in anticipation of subsequent legislation, the court said, "It would
have been competent for the General Assembly to provide
by the Workmen's Compensation Act that the employer
should pay compensation for injuries suffered outside of
the State."
Following this suggestion, whether aware of it or not,
the legislature did so amend the. act that in 1930 the court
was obliged to render a different decision. Here again,
the change is exactly analogous to the change made in
the Massachusetts statute and decisions. In Beale Brothers Supply Company v. Industrial Commission,7 the injured party, a resident of Illinois, was there engaged by
the plaintiff in error as a traveling salesman, with territory between Denver, Colorado, and the Pacific coast.
By agreement with the employer, he had moved his home
to Denver for convenience. While he was driving his
car near Sapinero, Colorado, on a mountain road which
was very wet and muddy, the car skidded and rolled
down the mountainside, pinning him beneath it and causing him severe injuries. The title of the act at this
time had been changed to read "An act to promote the
general welfare of the people of this State by providing
compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered
in the course of employment within this State, and without this State where the contract of employment is made
within this State."
Section 5 of the act as amended
provides that the term "employee" shall be construed to
mean "every person in the service of another under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
including persons whose employment is outside of the
State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within
the State of Illinois." Therefore, the court held that the
award of the commission was perfectly right, since the
contract was here entered into in Illinois. The Union
Bridge Company case, just discussed, was relied upon by
counsel for the plaintiff in error, but the court disposed
78 341 11. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930).
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of that case in these words, "This decision was rendered
in 1919. At that time the statute contained no provision
for injuries out of the State. Since that time the statute
Thus, it aphas been amended as above set forth."
pears that the courts of this state are definitely aligned
with those other states which adhere to the contract
theory of accidents arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act; that is, if the contract is made in this
state, compensation may be recovered. That this is so
is very definitely determined by the recent case of Cole v.
Industrial Commission.7 9 In that case, the injured party,
Fred Thews, was hired by the, plaintiff in Indiana for contracting work to be done in Illinois,. Thews worked on
the necessary machinery in, Indiana for four days, helped
load it on the cars, and followed it to Illinois, where he
worked until the time of the accident which caused his
death. His widow applied for compensation under the
Illinois act and the granting of an award was affirmed
in the circuit court. The employer appealed on the ground
that the Indiana rather than the Illinois, act applied,
since the employment was not strictly speaking an Illinois employment. The court held that it was Indiana
employment but refused to enforce the statute of Indiana
because it was not bound to do so under the full faith
and credit clause of the, Federal Constitution. Illinois,
therefore, allows compensation under its own act if
the contract is made in the state, regardless of where the
accident takes place, but it refuses to enforce the act of
any other state when the contract was made in that other
state.
SUMMARY

As was noted at the beginning of this study, some
courts in this country have stated clearly that, in their
opinion, the decisions on the question at hand are so
conflicting that they would not aid in reaching their own
decision. From a study of the cases, cited, it would
appear that this is not entirely so. It is true that there
79 353 1U. 415, 187 N. E. 520 (1933).
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is a great deal of conflict apparent at first blush, but
when one differentiates between elective and compulsory
acts, a fairly certain tendency may be noted.
In the case of compulsory statutes, 8 0 by far the majority of the courts enforce the statutes of their own
states, with strict regard to their terms, of course, if the
injury occurred in the state unless the statute specifically
provides that injuries occurring out of the state may be
included. Compulsory statutes of other states will not
be enforced, as, a matter of right, except as any other
statute is enforced, that is, as a matter of comity, and
comity will not influence decisions when the foreign act is
contrary to the public policy or positive law of the state
of the forum.
With regard to elective statutes,"' however, the situation is different. The courts, almost without .exception,
hold that an elective statute, when the parties have
elected to come under its terms, becomes a part of the
contract of employment, and therefore may be enforced
in the state in which the contract is made without regard
to the place where the accident occurs, unless the
entire performance is to take place elsewhere. It is
right here, however, that the courts, seem to retreat from
their definite declaration that it is a contract. They
announce that the rule of conflict of laws-the validity
and effect of the contract will be governed by the law of
the place where the contract is made-will apply, and
therefore find no difficulty in enforcing the statutes of
their own jurisdictions when the contract is made there;
but they still refuse, with one or two notable exceptions
(especially New York), to enforce the statute of another
state when the contract is made in that other state or the
s8 Compensation Compulsory: Maryland, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington, Wyoming, Arizona, California, Georgia. Bulletins, U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, No. 203, January 1917, (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office), "Workmen's Compensation Laws of the United States and
Foreign Countries," p. 53.
81 Compensation Elective: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Missouri. Ibid., p. 53.
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entire performance is, to take place there."2 If the contract of employment, made under such circumstances, is
to be treated purely as a contract, of which the statute
of the place where it is made is a part, why should the
courts refuse to enforce the statute of such other state any
more than they would refuse to enforce a contract made
in another state? A suit on a contract is in general, a
transitory action and may be enforced anywhere that
service may be obtained on the defendant, regardless of
where the contract was entered into or what its terms
were. Therefore, since the action under the compensation
act. is a suit on a contract, of which the statute is a part,
and since the suit is transitory in nature, it would seem
that the court could not fully enforce the contract without
enforcing the statute which is a part thereof. The vast
majority of the courts, however, have refused to go this
far, feeling, perhaps, that such action would be an extraterritorial recognition of a statute that might be contrary to the public policy or settled law of the forum.
This is not true, strictly speaking, because the court
under those circumstances would not be enforcing a
statute but would be enforcing a contract. Perhaps this
logic will someday appeal to the courts. It will then no
longer be necessary to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
merely becaus:e the action is brought in a jurisdiction
other than that in which the contract is made or the
performance is to take place.
82 Local act said to have extraterritorial effect: Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, West
Virginia, Georgia, Missouri.
Local act said not to have extraterritorial effect: California, Kansas, laryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington.
Law not explicit in these states: Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. Ibid., p. 62 note.

